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From the ‘August’ crisis in 2008 to the high-scale intervention in the Syrian Civil War there 
had been increasing tensions between Russia and West that changed the global geopolitical 
scenario. The bulk of the literature has focused mostly on the bilateral relations between the 
U.S. and the Russian Federation, and its strategic implications in conflictive regional orders 
such as the Post-Soviet Space, Middle East and the Black Sea region. By looking at the inter-
national impact of regional conflicts in Central Eurasia, this paper seeks to shed light on the 
strategic triangle in the Western Hemisphere which brings Latin America, next to Washington 
and Moscow. By using a systemic framework, this article argues that rising tension between 
US and Russia affects not only the strategic calculations of Latin American chancelleries but 
also the type of Moscow’s regional strategy which would be more prone to emphasize geo-
political over economic factors, affecting negatively the degree of Russian influence in the 
region. To assess these arguments, I present two types of empirical elements. On the one hand, 
I present data about UN General Assembly voting in the 1991–2015 period which shows that 
there had been a decline in the voting agreement between Latin America and Russia in the 
last decade, while the region has improved its engagement with the US. On the other hand, 
I analyze briefly how Argentina, Mexico and Brazil vote in the specific cases of the Georgian 
and Ukrainian conflicts at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council.
Keywords: Russia, Latin America, New Cold War.
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been constrained in its relations with the 
world by two interlinked regional features, the existence of the United States (US) hegem-
ony under the Western Hemisphere in which faces no imminent threats [1; 2, p. 10] and 
the asymmetry of military and economic capabilities between the US and the rest of the 
countries [3]. However, it does not mean neither that the hegemony operates absolutely, 
nor the asymmetry has blocked — sometimes successful — attempts to gain autonomy 
in world politics. For various reasons, LAC countries have sought ways to enhance their 
influence in the international arena, moving away from the structural hemispheric con-
straints while looking for global diversification in their foreign policy strategies. In the 
2000s, there were hope about an ascending regional agency based on the role of Brazil as 
a global player and an agenda of autonomist collectivization in which the central concern 
was related with the preservation of autonomy vis-a-vis the US [4]. The arrival of the left 
in most of the South American countries also provided incentives to bypass the US influ-
ence in an age of unilateralism and military adventurism under George W. Bush.
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Until the 2008/2009 crisis seemed to be a period of increasing influence of LAC in 
world politics, not only due to the fastest economic growth, but also because of the collec-
tive will to enhance the political and economic opportunities of a favorable international 
environment characterized by high commodities prices, satisfactory terms of trade, easy 
and cheap access to international financing and the outstanding rise of China [5].
However, the international financial crisis started affecting the positive economic ex-
ternalities and therefore, producing negative impacts on the political sustainability of the 
left-wing governments, such as the cases of Brazil under Dilma and the post-Chavez’s 
Venezuela [6]. At the same time, great power rivalry become again a central element of in-
ternational politics after the uncalculated consequences of the 2003 Iraq’s invasion and the 
revitalization of the Russia Federation in Central Eurasia. In a more turbulent economic 
and military context, LAC has entered again in a new wave of regional peripherization 
with a declining regional agency. 
In the first section, I introduce the global scenario in which LAC countries engage 
with the U.S. and Russia by focusing on the geopolitical and security agenda. Then, I 
present the Russia’s strategy in Latin America and how it deals with global and regional 
changes. Finally, I present comparative data on voting behavior in two fields. First, at the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on how LAC vote in general regarding the 
U.S. and the Russian positions. Second, how major LAC countries has voted at UNGA 
and the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the two major Eurasian conflicts: Georgia and 
Ukraine. 
A new global geopolitical scenario
The geopolitical uncertainty is the new name of normality in the international order. 
According to Richard Falk, we are living a period “where there is no coherent geopoliti-
cal structure, with various tendencies present, ranging from a continuing global war on 
terror to a second Cold War to a new set of alignments and rivalries associated with a 
rising China and newly assertive Russia” [7, p. 42]. In a new global scenario character-
ized by the rise of geopolitical tensions and the displacement of economic dynamism 
from the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific, have been generating a “new global gravitational 
pull” in which Russia and China has advanced ambitious projects to integrate the whole 
Eurasia [8]. The current uncertainty shows some glimmers of a new configuration of the 
international order, in which the future of geopolitics is closer to the “Return of Marco 
Polo’s World” in which the America’s ability to shape the power balance in Eurasia is 
decreasing [9].
One of the most outstanding examples of these upcoming arrangement have been 
the publication of the new Trump’s National Security Strategy, presented in December 
2017, asserts that the US “will respond to the growing political, economic, and military 
competitions we face around the world. China and Russia challenge American power, 
influence, and interests” [10]. Frontal tensions between US and the People’s Republic of 
China around the US-led trade war is novel, but the US-Russian ties had suffered a clear 
deterioration since mid-2000s, despite some initiatives to find some modus vivendi such 
as the ‘Reset’ attempt under the early Obama’s administration. 
The structural problems were in crescendo. A comprehensive expansion of US-led 
interests in Eastern Europe, Middle East and the Post-Soviet space matched with a new 
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wave of external assertiveness from Moscow. NATO accomplished an expansion towards 
the borderlines of the Russia Federation including former Soviet countries such as Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania (2004), while the Eastern Enlargement process of the European 
Union reached its peak with the incorporation of Bulgaria and Romania (2007), while 
trying to pull apart Ukraine from the Russian Federation.
By using a mix of defensive and offensive strategies, Russia has returned to the great 
power league after a couple of decades of intensive competence in the strategic and mili-
tary arena throughout the Great Eurasia space. A later US hegemonic retreat from the 
Middle East left further space for a more adventuristic Moscow’s foreign policy in a re-
gion abandoned since the demise of the Soviet Union. The new strategic environment had 
been characterized by the existence of armed conflicts from the Black Sea to the Middle 
East has revitalized the role of military power, in addition to provide room for external 
intervention for regional and extra-regional great powers. In this context, there has been 
an expected consequence, the increasing Russia — NATO tensions, which also lead to 
characterize this new strategic environment as a revival of the Cold War era. 
In this sense, the return of geopolitical factors such as the enforcement of zone of 
influences and the rejection of extra-regional hard engagement have been major drivers 
in the Eurasia region heated up frozen disputes generating armed conflicts — with Rus-
sia’s direct and indirect intervention — although without large-scale confrontation. Two 
conflicts are particularly relevant to understand the today’s Central Eurasia: Georgia and 
Ukraine. 
The cooperative environment in Eurasia started to fall apart with the Russo-Georgian 
2008 conflict. During this dispute, two Black Sea littoral states not only engaged in mili-
tary actions, but the maritime space was the theater of a naval battle, off the coast of Ab-
khazia, for the first time since the Second World War. The ‘Five-Day War’ (8–12 August 
2008) started when the Georgian Army entered the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia. 
As a response, Russia began a ‘peace coercion operation’ against Georgia, which would 
end in the military defeat of Georgia and the subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.
Regarding Ukraine, the crisis had its proximate roots in the final track of the negotia-
tions between the EU and Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement. This was initially 
supported by the Ukrainian President Yanukovych; however, his government backpedaled 
in November 2013. When Yanukovych abandoned his position after the ‘Euromaidan’ 
protests, pro-Russian demonstrations started in Crimea. Then, the Crimean Parliament 
called for a referendum asking whether the people would be in favor of being part of Rus-
sia or continuing as part of Ukraine by getting back the 1992 Constitution, which granted 
greater autonomy. The first option won the referendum — which both Ukraine and the 
West described as illegal — and by March 18, the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol had 
become federal subjects of the Russian Federation. At the same time, a low-intensity inter-
nal war continues in the Eastern Ukraine between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces. 
As a case of conceptual stretching and a misleading historical analogy, analyst and 
officials started to characterize the novel era of confrontation  — especially after the 
2008 Georgian crisis and the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute between 2008 and 2009 — as 
kind of a ‘New Cold War’. 
At the Munich Security Conference 2007, Putin criticized the idea of an unipolarity 
since the world was “witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force  — military 
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force — in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of per-
manent conflicts” in which “finding a political settlement also becomes impossible” [11]. 
A  year later with the return of conflicts in the post-Soviet space, Lucas presents the notion 
of a New Cold War fought through cash, natural resources, diplomacy, and propaganda in 
which “the battle lines […] are increasingly clear: America, Britain, and some European 
countries, mostly ex-communist ones, are trying to stand up against the Kremlin” [12, 
p. 10]. Almost a decade later, the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev criticized the 
Western approach toward Russia and stated that “NATO’s policy towards Russia remains 
unfriendly and generally obdurate. Speaking bluntly, we are rapidly rolling into a period of 
a new cold war. Russia has been presented as well-nigh the biggest threat to NATO, or to 
Europe, America and other countries” [13]. Lately Putin dismissed this idea as a matter of 
propaganda, not reflecting the nature of the international order [14], but the narrative of 
a ‘new Cold War’ stands firm especially among think tanks, officials and national institu-
tions dealing with defense and security areas in the West. 
Despite the false analogies between the old Cold War system and the new interna-
tional reality [15], Russia is portraited in the West as a challenger, competitor or destabi-
lizer in various dimensions, including on regional strategic competence around US zones 
of influence such as the Western Hemisphere [16; 17].
A challenger? Moscow’s strategy in Latin America
During a presentation at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2015, 
the Commander of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)  — later 
White House Chief of Staff for President Donald Trump-, General John Kelly denounced 
that, as part of its grand strategy, “Russia is using power projection in an attempt to erode 
U.S. leadership and challenge U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere” while develop-
ing ‘Cold War-tactics’ by the Russian leadership [18]. A research published by the Mark 
Smith within the Russian Series of UK Defence Academy agrees in the intertwined rela-
tion between the Moscow’s global strategy, its multipolar vision of world politics and the 
declining US influence both globally and in Latin America [19, p. 2]. With ups and downs, 
there has been an increasing overlapping of visions in the Western capitals between the 
narrative of the ‘new Cold War’ and the ‘concerning Russian activities’ in Latin America.
Beyond these oversimplifications, relations between Russia and LAC should be traced 
far behind this intense global scenario. Despite geographical and cultural remoteness, first 
diplomatic ties started in the 19th century during the Tzarist Empire [20, p. 5], while the 
presence peaked in the Cold War with the development of a ‘dual foreign policy’ from 
Moscow based on strategic interest of the Soviet Union and the implementation of a revo-
lutionary line, despite the U.S. efforts to avoid Latin America from establishing extensive 
connections [21, p. 214–215]. 
The end of the Soviet Union impacted both positive and negatively on regional rela-
tions. On one side, in the short-term, the economic and social collapse of the newly born 
Russian Federation affected immediately the trade ties, while the contraction of its global 
commitments means the loss of interest in the Third World in general, and Latin America 
in particular. The widespread perception of Russia’s LAC partners was of abandonment, es-
pecially by Cuba. The relinquishment of about 500 projects in the Caribbean island, “led to 
the deterioration of Moscow’s image, creating an impression of Russia as a disloyal partner, 
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not only in Cuba, but throughout the region, even in countries opposing to Castro’s regime. 
Moscow came to be regarded as a minor, uncritically minded partner of the West” [22, p. 92].
On the other side, in a longer term, the political and international identity of the new 
Russia set the bases for a more ‘normal’ relation without the constraints of an ideological 
war, hegemonic challenge and the duality of Soviet goals, thus allowing a new route for 
pragmatism. This new reality initially would appear with the Latin American tour of the 
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1996/97 and his vision of a multipolar world and a 
proposed multi-vectoral foreign policy in which Latin America become one of such vec-
tors [21, p. 215]. A limited engagement with LAC was advanced also by a public-private 
interest around the energy and military-industrial sectors with companies such as Lukoil, 
Gazprom, Rosneft and Rosoboronexport [23]. 
The complex interaction between a power-oriented global strategy and pragmat-
ic economic interests would provide the basis for a ‘new policy’ in the region towards 
LAC. In this sense, the international environment, particularly the U.S. — Russian rela-
tions, would shape the difficult equilibria between prioritize geostrategic or economic-
based pragmatic strategies. In this case, I assumed that more US-Russia tension would 
usually lead to a more geopolitical and tic-tac-toe approaches in LAC than in a relaxed 
bilateral and multilateral environment. A new duality in the Russia’s strategy towards LAC 
would be constrained not by the Moscow’s own preferences, but on the increasingly un-
certain global chess game. 
Going back to the ‘new policy’, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russia perceived 
that the region still had an important degree of agency and autonomy vis-a-vis US. In this 
sense, the “change in Russian views about relations with the LAC was a result of geopoliti-
cal concerns: from Moscow’s perspective, Latin America is a key geopolitical region in a 
multipolar world. Brazil, the largest country in the region, plays a particularly important 
role with its claim for a permanent seat on the UNSC, and its membership of BRICS — a 
group of emerging economies that strongly advocate the multipolar world order. Argen-
tina, Brazil and México are also members of the G20” [21, p. 216].
In the early 2000s, the Kremlin’s strategy towards LAC was characterized by a prag-
matic stance, without aiming to undermine directly U.S. interests in the Hemisphere. For 
example, Putin announced in 2001  the closure of the Lourdes’ communication intelli-
gence facility in Cuba. However, after the Russo-Georgian 2008 conflict, Russia has been 
rising its profile in the region by advancing presidential visits (Table 1), arms and energy 
deals, trade and military actions (Table 2).
The new environment pushed Russia to alter the balance between geostrategic im-
peratives and economic pragmatism. The strategy would change towards a mimic-like 
approach trying to mirror the uncomfortable U.S. and NATO policies in the post-Soviet 
area, with more assertive political and military actions in the Western Hemisphere, thus 
playing the ‘geopolitical game’ [26]. However, the new strategy’s main objective did not 
aim to displace or challenge the US hegemony, but to increase its costs of involvement in 
the Russian ‘near abroad’. At the same time, in LAC there was fertile ground for this kind 
of transoceanic adventures, Bolivarian left-wing governments. For example, Nicaragua 
and Venezuela recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia not only as a 
signal of friendship to Russia, but of regional resistance towards the US — especially those 
from the ALBA, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, — while the rest of 
left-wing governments would try to strengthen their positions towards the US.
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Table 1. Presidential, Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Visits 
from the Russian Federation to LAC
Year Authority Visited Countries
1996/7 MFA Yevgeny Primakov Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia
2000 Vladimir Putin Cuba
2004 Vladimir Putin Brazil and Chile (APEC Summit)
2006 MFA Sergei Lavrov Brazil 
2008 Dmitry Medvedev Perú, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba 
2013 MFA Sergei Lavrov Ecuador y Venezuela 
2010 Dmitry Medvedev Argentina and Brazil (BRICS Meeting)
2012 Vladimir Putin Mexico (G20 Meeting)
2013 MFA Sergei Lavrov Brazil 
2014 MFA Sergei Lavrov Nicaragua, Cuba, Chile, y Peru
2014 Vladimir Putin Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and Brazil (BRICS 
Meeting)
2015 MFA Sergei Lavrov Cuba, Nicaragua, Perú y Colombia
2016 Vladimir Putin Peru (APEC Meeting)
2018 Vladimir Putin Argentina (G20 Meeting)
Table 2. Bilateral trade between Latin America and the Caribbean 
and Russian Federation (in USD millions)
Year LAC Exports LAC Imports Total Trade
1992  1382,0  540,8  1922,8
1995  2295,0  1059,7  3354,7
2001 2127,6 4272,4 6400
2005  5614,5 5239,7 10854,2
2010  7088,9 4813,8 11902,7
2011  7696,1 7802,9 15499
2012 7028,4 8520,6 15549
2013 7273,9 9055,7 16329,6
2014 8230,4 9181,7 17412,1
2015 5669,5 6996,2 12665,7
2016 5335,4 6269,0 11604,4
2017 6089,5 6872,4 12961,9
Source: [22; 23].
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Among the key facts that Russian military and security forces advanced were the 
participation of the Russian Navy in military exercises with the Venezuelan Navy (VEN-
RUS-200, 2008), sending two long-range bombers Tu-160 to Venezuela (2008), opening a 
counternarcotic center facility in Nicaragua (2017), providing an oceanographic research 
vessel (Yantar, Project 22010-class) to find the missing Argentine Submarine ARA San 
Juan (2018) and lately, announcing the reopening of a communications facility in Cuba 
(2019), in addition to renew military co-operation with Cuba and Venezuela and develop 
naval deployments in the Caribbean ports and the Atlantic Ocean [27].
Since mid-2010s, two of the fundamental vectors of the Russia’s mimic-like strategy 
began to fall apart, the political retreat of the leftist governments and the socio-economic 
collapse of Venezuela. Even if the ideology is a secondary element in the Moscow’s secu-
rity and foreign policy, the political turn toward the right is not. The end of the PT rule in 
Brazil and the displacement of Frente para la Victoria in Argentina by the Cambiemos Al-
liance lead by Mauricio Macri has made the cooperation with extra-regional powers less 
autonomous from the US pressure in South America. In a novel political context, marked 
by the existence of strong internal crises, the major actors are not so are not so interested 
in bothering the regional hegemon by increasing their ties with Russia, especially on the 
sensitive strategic issues. At the same time, the new wave of center-right and rightist gov-
ernments perceived negatively the still ongoing relations between Russia and the ALBA’s 
countries. Agreeing with Jeifets et alt., these ‘ideologization’ “limits Moscow’s attempts to 
build contacts with opposition forces in these countries and creates serious risks for Rus-
sian businesses in the event of inevitable political change” [21, p. 224].
LAC — US — Russia triad at the United Nations
Based on political and strategic preferences, Russia has prioritized bilateralism in the 
relations with LAC, underlying partnership with those countries who has supported Mos-
cow’s positions in international fora such as the United Nations. Then, it pays attention 
to those leading regional and political such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina which shares 
G20 membership. Even if multilateralism is not the central approach in its foreign policy 
strategy, it is for LAC countries which usually develop an active agenda in which advance 
key issues of their agenda such as the Brasilia’s quest for a permanent seat at the UNSC or 
the Malvinas Issue for Argentina. In this context, the multilateral fora is also relevant for 
the Russian diplomacy to track the degree of closeness and support towards its positions. 
LAC, US and Russian voting at UN General Assembly 
Historically, LAC and Russia have a high degree of cohesiveness in voting preferences 
at the UNGA. It is not the same in relation to the US. In this case, what matters is not the 
voting distance, but the evolution of the LAC voting regarding these two global actors. To 
assess the interactions between LAC and Russia, and to compare the distance of the pref-
erences with the US, I present data which shows the proportion of LAC votes that match 
with votes cast by Russia or the US on the same issue based on the deal points derived 
from states’ UNGA vote choices from 1991 until 2015. The UN Ideal Points Data help us 
to measure temporal variability in the positions between pair of states, while also provide 
us a basis for comparative evolution with third states or group of states. 
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The ideal point data is built on the Lijphart’s index of agreement between two states. 
In the “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data” dataset 1 equals a state that al-
ways agrees with the other state, and 0 if it never agrees. It should be noted that the ideal 
point estimate analysis can be complimented by votes identified as important by the U.S. 
State Department, around 7–12 a year [28]. In relation to the US-Russia relations, ideal 
point estimate was already tested successfully since the “gap between the ideal points does 
not fluctuate erratically” and the “model accurately keeps the two countries much further 
apart during the Cold War than at any point during the Cold War’s aftermath” [29].
In the case of the LAC voting behavior, in the Fig. 1 I present the mean of their posi-
tions vis-a-vis US, Russia and Brazil. I include Brazil to measure the degree of cohesive-
ness among the Latin American and Caribbean Group at the United Nations, which is 
quite elevated. In the Fig. 2, I arranged a common stance based on the mean of the LAC 
main regional powers’ positions: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico towards US and Russia. 
The ideal points derived from LAC vote choices at UNGA portraits a closer and per-
manent relation in the multilateral preferences with Russia over US, with a series of ups 
and downs which can strengthen previous arguments on the impact of systemic factors 
Fig. 2. UN Ideal Points Data — LAC Regional Powers (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) with the U.S. 
and Russia
Fig. 1. UN Ideal Points Data — LAC with the U.S., Russia and Brazil at the AGNU
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on the LAC behavior and the Russian geopolitical/pragmatic balance in the foreign policy 
towards LAC. First, it seems that an active Russian diplomacy within a low-tension envi-
ronment between US and Russia pays positively in the UNGA voting behavior. Since the 
1996/97 Primakov visit until the year before the Georgian crisis, the multilateral closeness 
would increase more than 10  %. On the contrary, high-level visits and multiple diplo-
matic, economic and military activities cannot reverse a negative trajectory if bilateral 
tensions among these two great powers rise up. In the 2008–2015 period, the distance 
between the ideal points grew more than 14  %. The conjunction of an assertive Russia and 
the multiplication of anxieties in the relations US did not help Moscow’s role in the West-
ern Hemisphere. The second graph show similar tendencies, while the degree of closeness 
with US is barely higher in the last decade. In this case, it should be useful to address how 
the major LAC regional powers reacted to the armed conflicts in Central Eurasia.
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico face Eurasian conflicts 
After the Russian short military intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the 
diplomatic choices around an international recognition of these new entities were not a 
difficult choice. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico remained neutral during the conflict while 
later they do not recognize these entities as independent states based on the principle of 
territorial integrity. In the formal statements, Brazil called for a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict based on the mediation of the Council of Europe and reaffirmed the “commit-
ment to the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for the territorial integ-
rity and respect for human rights” [30, p. 223–224]. 
The Ministries of Foreign Relations in Argentina and Mexico released official positions 
in the same line. After the Russia’s international recognition of Abkhazia and South Os-
setia and contrary to the Nicaragua and Venezuela’s decision, the three countries reacted 
unanimously although without risking their relationship with Russia. Brazilian MFA Cel-
so Amorim stated that “Brazil defends very strongly the principle of territorial integrity of 
States and we do not believe that this should be relativized” [29], while Argentina grounded 
in that principle its position regarding the Malvinas and the Islands of the South Atlantic. 
Years later, during a bilateral visit Argentinean MFA Hector Timmerman openly said that 
“Buenos Aires recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia and advocates a peaceful solu-
tion to the problem” [31]. On its side, Mexico underlined his concern about regional and 
global stability, and call both sides for a peaceful and lasting solution in the Caucasus re-
gion through dialogue [32]. During the conflict, Costa Rica and Panama were at the UNSC 
but there were not serious discussions unless the extension of the United Nations Observer 
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) which resolution was approved unanimously on 9 October 
2008. After less than one year, Russia vetoed a resolution authorizing another extension [33].
The moderation of the regional leading countries would be seen again during the 
Ukrainian crisis. On 15 March, a day before the Crimean status referendum, most of the 
Western allies submit a draft resolution on Ukraine (S/2014/189) at the UNSC that was 
not adopted due to the Russian veto. No Latin American country joined the presentation 
of the draft resolution, but Chile and Argentina voted favorably. According to the Ambas-
sador Perceval, “because it asserted the principle of territorial integrity and would have 
contributed to constructive dialogue towards a peaceful solution involving all political 
actors” [34]. 
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Regarding the UNGA, for Moscow was crucial for its LAC regional policy the opinion 
of the Brazil, Argentina and Mexico in the voting of the resolution A/68/2621 on 27 March 
2014 (on the territorial integrity of Ukraine and against Russia’s activities in Crimea) after 
the referendum and the later accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation. In GRULAC, 
the vote was not unanimous. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Ecuador — among 
others — abstained, while the countries of the newly born Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colom-
bia, Peru and Mexico) voted in favor. Finally, the Bolivarian axis (Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela 
and Nicaragua) rejected. 
The Argentine UN Ambassador Perceval disagreed on the politically-bias interpreta-
tion of the territorial integrity principle stated in the draft resolution, while “rejects initia-
tives that seek to isolate one of the parties or impose unilateral economic sanctions that 
undermine the conditions conducive to a dialogue that is so urgent” [35, p. 20]. In this 
case, presidential diplomacy between Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and Vladimir Putin 
played a key role [37]. On Brazil, the Ambassador Patriota called for restrain and a diplo-
matic solution of the crisis [35, p. 7], in addition to various tensions with the US around 
the vulture funds issue. 
In later voting on situation of human rights in the Crimean Peninsula, Brazil, Argen-
tina and Mexico at AGNU abstained in 2016 and 2017 (A/RES/71/205 y A/RES/72/190). 
Even if the political coalitions and ideological orientation changed both in Argentina 
and Brazil, they did not move their balanced positions regarding the Crimean issue, 
maintaining a sphere of autonomy in an issue characterized by the US State Department 
as an ‘important vote’ for the 71st UNGA in 2016. The voting behavior on the Crime-
an issue reflected the left-right cleavage, but in the specific case of norms involving 
criticism on human rights still matters principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
which characterized the normative basis of the Latin American diplomacy inward and 
outward [4; 38].
Mirror game and the decline of the regional agency: 
the limits of the Moscow’s strategy
By using a systemic arguments and empirical referents, the article shows that US-
Russia are affecting negatively Moscow’s regional strategy and its influence in the region. 
The region is going through a declining phase of its regional agency which is affecting 
the relations with extra-regional powers, especially those more concerned on the hard 
than the soft agenda. For example, despite the increasing pressions, China is suffering less 
than Russia since the Beijing’s strategy relies more on economic incentives than political 
interests. Russia’s regional mimic strategy had shown its limits, not because of the lack of 
will on the Moscow’s side, but due to the changing regional scenario in which there was 
a transformation of the political landscape from left to right-wing governments which 
usually perceive the US as the major partner in the region, or at least, they do not see as 
a menace. In addition to the political changes, major LAC regional powers are suffering 
deep political and economic crisis such as Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, which limits 
the odds to act with assertiveness in the global arena. 
1 The draft resolution was initially submitted by Canada, Costa Rica, Germany, Lithuania, Poland and 
Ukraine.
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